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KENTu Ky LAw JouRNAL
SILENCE AS AN ADMISSION IN KENTUCKY
CRIMINAL CASES
The purpose of this note is to discuss and clarify the law in Ken-
tucky on silence as an admission against interest in criminal cases.
The cases on this subject are in a state of confusion. In order to
understand the Kentucky situation, the problem will be examined
generally before analyzing the cases and suggesting changes.
I. Silence-Historical Development
In the early English and American cases the courts generally held
that silence in the face of an accusation was admissible even though
the accusatory statement would otherwise have been excluded as
hearsay.' One of the theories behind this rule of evidence was that
the average innocent person would deny any false accusation made by
another;2 it would be contrary to man's nature to fail to make such a
denial.3 Another theory for the rule was based on the ancient maxim,
qui tacet consentire videtur, which means, "silence gives consent."4
The courts limited the application of this broad maxim by holding
that "whatever was said in a party's presence was receivable against
him as an admission" because he presumably assented to it.5 This rule
resulted in a high degree of risk in that the accused was unduly
prejudiced by the admission of his failure to deny. In order to protect
the accused it became imperative to modify the rule.
An early indication of the trend toward qualification of the rule
was found in two civil cases: (1) the evidence should always be re-
ceived with caution; the accusation should be of the kind which natur-
ally calls for contradiction;8 (2) silence as an admission should create
no more than in inference.1 While these qualifications did not develop
directly within the criminal law, they undoubtedly had an influence
on criminal cases.
In 1847, the Massachusetts court rendered the landmark decision,
Commonwealth v. Kenney,8 which placed limitations on the rule
regarding tacit admissions by an accused. The court held that the
accusations by a watchman to the effect that the defendant had stolen
money, to which the defendant made no reply, were not competent
evidence of admission of the theft. The court stated that there are
14 Wigmore, Evidence §1071 (3rd ed. 1940); 47 Mich. L. Rev. 715, 716
(1949); 15 U. Miami L. Rev. 161, n. 7 (1960).
247 Mich. L. Rev. 715, 716 (1949).
35 St. Louis U. L.J. 469, 490 (1958).
44 Wigrore, op. cit. supra note 1, §1071.
5 ibid.
814 S. & R. 388, 393 (Pa. 1826).
7Vail v. Strong, 10 Vt. (1 Sh.) 457, 463 (1838).
853 Mass. (12 Met.) 235 (1847).
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some cases where silence might be an admission, but it would depend
on two facts: (1) whether he hears and understands the statement,
and comprehends its meaning; and
(2) whether the truth of the facts embraced in the statement is
within his knowledge, or not; whether he is in such a situation that
he is at liberty to make any reply; and whether the statement is
made under such circumstances, and by such persons, as naturally
to call for a reply, if he did not intend to admit it.9
The modem rule incorporates these limitations upon the original
rule. Today the silence of an accused may be admissible into evidence
as an implied, tacit, or adoptive admission,'0 or as an admission which
manifests a probable state of belief 1 or a consciousness of guilt.'2
However, certain general conditions must be met: (1) the accusation
must have been made in the presence and hearing of the accused;
(2) the accusation must have been understood and related to facts
within his knowledge; (3) the accused must have had a reasonable
opportunity to deny the statement; and (4) the accusation must have
been one which naturally would call for a denial from reasonable men
similarly situated.1
II. Silence-Before and After Arrest
There is general agreement that silence to accusations made be-
fore the defendant's arrest will be admitted if the above conditions
are met.14 However, there is a conflict of authority whether silence
is admissible in the face of an accusation made after arrest.
The majority' 5 of the jurisdictions has established the hard-and-
fast rule that the silence of a person when faced with an accusatory
statement after arrest is not admissible. 16 These courts refuse to allow
the prosecution to confront the defendant with his silence because of
the widely held fear that anything one says would be used against
him. Moreover, the individual unfamiliar with the law would want to
avoid a verbal battle with the police and by-standers before con-
sulting an attorney.
17
Another reason for ruling that silence is not admissible after an
arrest is that it might be regarded as an implied claim of the privi-
9Id. at 237.
10 6 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 593 (1958).
11 McCormick, Evidence §247 (1954).
124 Wigmore, Evidence §1072 (3rd. ed. 1940).
'3E.g., Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 235, 237 (1847). See
also 15 U. Miami L. Rev. 161, 163-64 (1960); 6 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 593, 594 (1958).
145 St. Louis U. L.J. 469, 488-90 (1958).
15 4 Wigmore op. cit. supra note 12. See also cases pro and con, listed in
Annots., 80 A.L.R. 1235 (1932), 115 A.L.R. 1510 (1938); Dec. Dig. Grim. Law
Key 407(2).
10 McCormick, Evidence §247 (1954).
175 St. Louis U. LJ. 469, 491 (1958).
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lege against self-incrimination.18 If silence were a claim of the priv-
ilege then the question would arise as to how the privilege should
be asserted. 19 To require that the accused expressly assert the privilege
would result in an unjust application since habitual criminals would
exercise the privilege while the inexperienced or innocent suspects
would be unaware of this right.20 The fear of effecting this result
through the use of the privilege of self-incrimination may have been
one reason for not allowing the admissibility of silence.
The rule in the federal courts is that no inference of assent can
be drawn from the silence of the accused person if he was under
arrest at the time that the accusation was made.21 In 1928, a circuit
court2 2 stated that if silence after arrest were admissible, the customary
warning should read: "If you say anything, it will be used against
you; if you do not say anything, that will also be used against you."23
Although this observation has a sarcastic tone, it appears that this
is precisely the situation in which the suspect finds himself in juris-
dictions following the minority rule as to the admissibility of silence
after arrest.
According to the minority rule the mere fact of arrest, by itself,
would not keep evidence of silence from the jury.24 Arrest is simply
one factor to be considered in determining the attendent circum-
stances.
This position was recognized in a recent New Jersey case,25 in
which the defendant was prosecuted for illegal gambling. The court
admitted testimony respecting the defendant's tacit admission of the
crime when confronted with incriminatory statements by co-conspir-
ators at the police station. This view is more flexible,26 since arrest
does not have as great an influence on the attendent circumstances.
III. Silence-Burden of Proof
The court determines whether evidence of silence is admissible.
27
This raises a question as to the burden of proof. Wigmore says that
the burden of proof should be on the opponent of the evidence. How-
18 6 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 593 (1958).
'Q Id. at 596.
2030 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1956).
21 See United States v. L. Biondo, 135 F.2d 180 (2nd Cir. 1943); Yep v.
United States, 83 F.2d 41 (10th Cir. 1936); McCarthy v. United States, 25 F.2d
298 (6th Cir. 1928).22 McCarthy v. United States, 25 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1928).
23 Id. at 299.
24 E.g., State v. Kobylarz, 44 N.J. Super. 250, 130 A.2d 80 (1957). See
5 St. Louis U. L.J. 469, 491 (1958).
25 State v. Kobylarz, 44 N.J. Super. 250, 130 A.2d 80, 86-87 (1957).
26 4 Wigmore op. cit. supra note 12, §1072.
27 6 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 593, 595 (1958).
[Vol. 50
ever, he concedes that in practice the burden generally falls on the
prosecution to show that the requisite conditions exist.
28
Even if the prosecution sustains the burden and the evidence of
silence goes before the jury, there will be ample opportunity for the
defense to "explain it away" in rebuttal by circumstances showing
that his silence was due to other reasons.2 9
IV. Silence-Admissibility in Kentucky
The decisions of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky on the admis-
sibility of silence are in such confusion that the practicing attorney
will find it difficult to ascertain whether this evidence will be ad-
mitted under any circumstances. In Jackson v. Commonwealth,"0 the
first Kentucky case dealing with silence, the defendant quickly denied
the accusations made by his co-conspirator. However, the court, by
dictum, stated that the evidence would have been incompetent, even
if the defendant had remained silent, because he had not been called
on to answer or deny. "He had the right to remain silent when charged
with the crime, and guilt is not to be imputed to him by reason of
that silence."31 The strictness of this dictum was substantiated in
Porter v. Commonwealth,32 where the Court of Appeals used the
Jackson case as authority for excluding the proof of the silence of
the defendant who had failed to deny the confession of his alleged
accomplice which implicated them both. The decision was reversed
because this implied admission by the defendant had been the prin-
cipal evidence against him on trial. However, the court broadened
the question of admissibility of silence by quoting Section 968 of
Robertson's Kentucky Criminal Procedure.33 The substance of that
section on the admissibility of evidence of silence is that the accused
must have heard, understood and been at liberty to make a reply
under such circumstances as naturally call for a reply.
The Jackson and the Porter cases, together with case authority
from Massachusetts 34 and Alabama 5 were used in the landmark deci-
sion of Merriweather v. Commonwealth."6 In this case the defendant,
a Negro, and others had been indicted for killing a white man. These
suspects had been chained to one another in the waiting room of a
depot. Subsequently a crowd gathered and some of the spectators
28 4 Wigmore op. cit. supra note 12, §1071.
29 Id. at §1072.
30 100 Ky. 239, 38 S.W. 422 (1896).
31Id. at 261, 38 S.W. at 427.
3222 Ky. L. Rep. 1657, 61 S.W. 16 (1901).
33 Id. at 1657-59, 61 S.W. at 17.
a4 Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met) 235 (1847).
35 Bob v. State, 32 Ala. 560 (1858).
36 118 Ky. 870, 82 S.W. 592 (1904).
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or law officers accused the defendant of murder. The defendant made
no reply to the accusations. On trial, the court overruled the defend-
ant's objections and admitted the accusations and the defendant's
silence. However, on appeal the admission of this evidence was ruled
prejudicial and reversible error. The court reasoned that the silence
of the defendant was natural since he feared for his life, lacked an
opportunity to consult counsel and was "ignorant of a proper course
to pursue."37 Furthermore, the court stated that if evidence of silence
under these circumstances was admissible then each accused would
have to "parry every cross-examination attempted by every self-
appointed questioner."38 The court in the Merriweather case enunci-
ated the general rule that if the silence of an accused was the admis-
sion of the truth of an accusatory statement, he made it his state-
ment by "adoption." 9 After setting forth this rule, the court outlined
a broad test which was to be used in deciding whether future situa-
tions called for the admission of silence by "adoption." In the first part
of the test the court gave the impression of limiting itself to a single
inquiry for the admission of such evidence:
The sole inquiry is, did the person attempted to be bound actually
admit it, voluntarily and understandingly? Is it evinced that by an
action of his mind he, in effect, likewise declared the fact to be as
stated?4o
However, the case established further requisites as the second half
of the test.
These were:
(1) Did the person to be bound by the statement hear it? (2) Did
he understand it? (3) Did he have an opportunity to express him-
self concerning it? (4) Was he called upon to act upon or reply to
it?41 [(5) C]ircumstances must be such as 'naturally and properly
call for some action or reply from men similarly situated.'
42
The first part of the Merriweather test is very strict in that it requires
that the silence constitute an admission as strong as the words of an
actual confession. If a judge used this part of the test exclusively, he
could hardly declare that any silence equaled an oral admission.
Therefore, the use of this part of the test would leave little possi-
bility for the admission of silence. The real substance lies in the
second half of the test, which calls for the fulfillment of exact pre-
requisites while still allowing flexibility in the judge's determination.
If these conditions are met, and if the situation is one which naturally
371d. at 878, 82 S.W. at 595.
38I1bid.
39 118 Ky. 870, 877, 82 S.W. 592, 594.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 118 Ky. 870, 878, 82 S.W. 592, 595.
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calls for a denial, then there is a strong possibility that the silence
would be admissible. In many of the later cases involving silence of
an accused, the Court of Appeals has only used either the first or the
second half of the Merriweather test; this has led to confusion as to
whether evidence of silence could be admitted under any circum-
stances.
In a 1909 case,43 the defendant was accused by his sister of a crime
in the presence of a crowd of angry men. He did not reply to this
accusation. The evidence of his silence was held inadmissible in
view of his fright and danger. The court used the second half of the
Merriweather test to reach its decision.44 The court added that evi-
dence of such a statement when not denied would sometimes be
admissible, but never unless the accused had heard and understood
the statement and had the liberty to reply.
In 1910,45 a confused court held that evidence of silence was inad-
missible. The court used the Merriweather case as authority for this
decision. However, this case was overruled by a later decision46
which stated that the Merriweather rule had been completely mis-
interpreted and extended beyond its original application. In 1915,47
the Court of Appeals held that the testimony of a witness who over-
heard a conversation between the two negro defendants while they
were in jail should be admitted. The statement made to one of the
defendants was, "You know you are the one that fired the shot."48
The court held that the statement and subsequent silence were ad-
missible under a different application of the Merriweather rule. How-
ever, this was an inaccurate observation because the second half of
the Merriweather test rather than a different application was used,
i.e., since the court reasoned that the statement was made under such
circumstances that the defendant, who was accused, naturally would
have denied the charge, if false. The court reasoned further that in
their ignorance, it was perfectly natural for the Negroes to believe
that the one who actually fired the shot was the more guilty.49
43 Sprouse v. Commonwealth, 132 Ky. 269, 116 S.W. 844 (1909).
44 See also Smith v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 599, 131 S.W. 499 (1910),
where the evidence of silence was admitted on the grounds that it is within the
res gestae as well as being within the Merriweather rule.
Hayden v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 634, 131 S.W. 521 (1910).46 Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 600, 242 S.W. 604 (1922). See also
Ellis v. Commonwealth, 146 Ky. 615, 143 S.W. 425 (1912), where the court
held that the defendant could not be prejudiced by a third party's statements
because the court had ruled that they -had been adopted any had been made
a part of the defendant's testimony.4 7 Wilson v. Commonwealth, 166 Ky. 301, 179 S.W. 237 (1915).
48 Id. at 309, 179 S.W. at 240.
49 Id. at 809-10, 179 S.W. at 240-41. See Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 195
Ky. 600, 242 S.W. 604 (1922), where the Court of Appeals again used the sec-
(Continued on next page)
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In 1929,50 the Court of Appeals held that the element of arrest
would not operate per se to keep the evidence of silence from the jury.
In the lower court, an officer had testified that, while under arrest,
the defendant was confronted with an accusation that he had killed
three men. On trial the defendant admitted that something had been
said to him, but denied that he had made any reply. The Court of
Appeals upheld 51 admittance of the evidence of silence. The court
used the second-half of the Merriweather test to show that the ac-
cusation had not only been heard and understood, under circum-
stances that allowed for ample opportunity to deny, but that it also
had been an accusation which called for a denial, if false. This ap-
parently settled the question of whether, under the Merriweather
rule, the factor of arrest by itself would keep the evidence of silence
from the jury.52
In Griffith v. Commonwealth,53 it was held that the defendant
didn't have to make repeated denials of accusations. The court
reasoned that because he had made denials, the Merriweather rule was
inapplicable.
In a subsequent case5 4 the court declared that a witness's state-
ment could not be considered as such an accusation as would imply
admission from the defendant's silence. The reasoning was mislead-
ing because the court quoted only the dictum from the Griffith deci-
sion which purported to limit the admission of the evidence of silence
"by declarations of one made without the sanction of an oath or of
the presence of death or as a spontaneous utterance connected with
the occurance."55 These strict limitations were not employed by the
Court in a subsequent case,5 6 which by dictum mentioned the second
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
ond half of the Merriweather rule in admitting evidence of a defendant's silence.
See Hord v. Commonwealth, 227 Ky. 439, 13 S.W.2d 244 (1928), where the
court reached an excellent result since the defendant, who was taken to the
hospital to see the man he allegedly shot, tried to conceal himself so that the
wounded man could not make an identification. When the wounded man ac-
cused the defendant of the shooting, he remained silence. This evidence of silence
was admitted.
50 Pierson v. Commonwealth 229 Ky. 584, 17 S.W.2d 697 (1929).
51 Apparently Peirson would have overruled the Jackson and Porter cases
if they had been expressly decided on the basts that the defendant had been
under arrest at the time of his silence.
See Finch v. Commonwealth, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 187, 92 S.W. 940 (1906),
where silence was admitted after an accusation even though the de-
fendant had been under arrest at the time. The second-half of the
Merriweather test was used as a basis for its decision.
52See Annot. 80 A.L.R. 1235 1260 (1932) for an excellent discussion of
Kentucky cases regarding silence ater arrest.
53250 Ky. 506, 63 S.W.2d 594 (1933).
54280 Ky. 830, 134 S.W.2d 945 (1939).
55 250 Ky. 506, 510, 635 S.W.2d 594, 596.56Lett v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 267, 144 S.W.2d 505 (1940).
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part of the Merriweather test as the test for the "adoption" rule.
The law on silence as an admission was further confused by White
v. Commonwealth,57 where the defendant, after his arrest, refused
to admit or deny a charge of rape; "I won't say that I did have inter-
course with either of these girls, Dorothy or Irene, and I won't say
that I did not at this time."58 The Commonwealth argued that this
was not silence in the face of an accusation. The court, however, held
that this was equivalent to silence, and thereby inadmissible under
the Merriweather rule.
The present state of the law regarding silence is reflected by a
statement of dictum in a 1960 case: 59 "there is an exception to the
rule against post-factum statements and conduct of co-conspirators
where they occur in the presence of the accused under such cir-
cumstances that his failure to deny reasonably implies an admission."60
V. Silence-Suggested Revisions
Before suggesting a test for the admissibility of evidence of silence,
it is necessary to look at the practical problem involved-how much
protection is to be granted defendants in criminal cases? Certainly,
defendants must have protection, but if the courts offer too much
protection many guilty defendants might escape punishment, and
the judicial system would not fulfill its duty to society. To avoid this
dilemma the evidence of silence shoud be admissible if certain con-
ditions are met: (1) the accusation must have been made within the
presence and hearing of the accused, (2) the accusation must have
been understood, (3) the accused must have had the opportunity to
deny the accusation and (4) the accusation must have occurred under
circumstances that would have called for a denial from men similarly
situated. This is in essence the second-half of the test adopted by the
Merriweather case.
It is further suggested that the court instruct the jury that the
accusation should be given weight only as it relates to defendant's
silence.61
Such evidence can be viewed in at least three ways: as an adop-
tion,0 2 as a belief in its truth, 3 or as a probable state of belief.64 The
adoptive theory is objectionable as prejudicial because: (1) the de-
57292 Ky. 416, 166 S.W.2d 873 (1942).
58 Id. at 421, 166 S.W.2d at 876.
59 Senibaldi v. Commonwealth, 338 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. 1960).
60 Id. at 918.
6115 U. Miami L. Rev. 161, 162 (1960).
62 Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met.), 235 (1847).
63 Model Code of Evidence rule 507(b) (1942); Uniform Rule of Evidence
rule 63(8) (1953).64 McCormick, Evidence §247 n. 9 (1954).
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fendant is bound by a hearsay declaration without any opportunity
to change its terms; (2) such adoption could be regarded as a con-
fession and unduly emphasized by the jury. The second view is
objectionable for these same reasons. Silence viewed as a manifes-
tation of a probable state of belief is acceptable because the jury
would be required to ascertain the defendant's state of mind and his
consciousness of the truth of the statement at the time of his failure
to deny.
The final suggestion is that Kentucky continue to hold that arrest
should not operate per se to keep the evidence of silence from the
jury. Even though there may be a tendency by the accused to remain
silent due to the fear that anything said after arrest will be used
against him, his silence can be explained as a result of this fear. The
admission of evidence of silence even after the arrest of the accused
is the better rule because it gives defendants protection against
undue prejudice due to the admission of the evidence of silence yet
still furnishes reasonable opportunity for conviction of the guilty.
Philip Taliaferro III
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